

### REMARKS

In the Office Action dated June 18, 2007, the Examiner rejected claims 1, 4, 7, 10, 17-18, and 24-34 under 35 U.S.C. §102(e) as being anticipated by U.S. Publication No. U.S. 2005/0131918 to Hillis et al. ("Hillis"); rejected claims 3, 5, 6, 22, and 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Hillis as applied to claim 1 above, and further in view of U.S. Publication No. U.S. 2005/0144297 to Dahlstrom et al. ("Dahlstrom"); rejected claims 8, 9, and 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Hillis as applied to claim 7 above, and further in view of U.S. Patent No. 7,072,888 to Perkins ("Perkins"); rejected claims 11, 12, and 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Hillis as applied to claim 7 above, and further in view of U.S. Publication No. U.S. 2003/0014428 to Mascarenhas ("Mascarenhas"); rejected claim 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Hillis as applied to claim 7 above, and further in view of U.S. Publication No. U.S. 2004/0199584 to Kirshenbaum ("Kirshenbaum"); rejected claim 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Hillis as applied to claim 1 above, and further in view of U.S. Publication No. U.S. 2005/0204276 to Hosea ("Hosea"), rejected claims 19 and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Hillis as applied to claim 1 and 18 above, and further in view of U.S. Publication No. U.S. 2005/0060404 to Ahlander ("Ahlander"); rejected claim 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Hillis as applied to claim 1 above, and further in view of Mascarenhas; and rejected claim 35 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Hillis in view of U.S. Patent No. U.S. 6,698,020 to Zigmond et al. ("Zigmond").

By this amendment, claims 1, 5, 8-15, 18-19, 21, and 29-32 have been amended. Claims 4, 7, and 33-35 are cancelled. These amendments do not introduce new matter; support can be found in the specification at least on pages 5, 9, and 15.

Applicants do not agree with the Examiner's statements made in the Final Office Action, and these amendments are made for the purpose of expediting prosecution. Applicants reserve the right to pursue the original subject matter in later applications.

#### **I. Rejection of Claims 1, 4, 7, 10, 17-18, and 24-34 under 35 U.S.C. §102(e)**

Independent claim 1, as amended, recites "identifying at least one trust score, wherein the at least one trust score is associated with a specific one of a plurality of evaluators; [and]

determining an **aggregate rating for the document based on the rating information and the at least one trust score.**" Independent claims 29-32 recite similar limitations.

First, Applicants assert that Hillis is not prior art for the teachings asserted by the Final Office Action. Hillis was filed as a utility application on May 24, 2004, two months after the present application. The Hillis application claimed priority to provisional application: US Application Serial No. 60/529,245 (the '245 provisional application) filed on December 12, 2003. However, one ordinarily skilled in the art would immediately recognize that the Hillis application is **different** than the provisional application. Thus, the Hillis application can only be asserted for the teachings found within the provisional application. As such Applicants request that future Office Actions make explicit mention of the particular portions of the provisional application which disclose the features for which the Hillis reference is being used. Applicants points the Examiner to 35 U.S.C. 102(e). MPEP Section 706.02(f)(1), Section I (and similarly disclosed in MPEP 2136.03, Section III), which recites:

The **subject matter used in the rejection must be disclosed in the earlier-filed application** in compliance with 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, in order for that subject matter to be entitled to the earlier filing date under 35 U.S.C. 102(e). (emphasis added)

As such, any rejection utilizing the Hillis reference must cite the relevant portions of the '245 provisional application to show prior invention of the subject matter for which the Hillis reference is being used to reject the current application.

The '245 provisional application only mentions that "several reputations systems may be combined using a weighted averaging scheme, the weights reflecting the relative degree to which the user trusts each reputation system." The weights are not used in any aggregate rating for a document. Therefore, the '245 provisional application fails to teach or suggest "identifying at least one trust score, wherein the at least one trust score is associated with a specific one of a plurality of evaluators; [and] determining an **aggregate rating for the document based on the rating information and the at least one trust score,**" as recited in amended claim 1.

Second, even assuming *arguendo* that the Hillis reference is entitled to the earlier effective date for the asserted subject matter, Hillis does not disclose, teach or otherwise suggest

“identifying at least one trust score, wherein the at least one trust score is associated with a specific one of a plurality of evaluators; [and] determining **an aggregate rating for the document based on the rating information and the at least one trust score**,” as recited in amended claim 1. The Examiner states on page 5 of the Office Action that Hillis discloses the cited limitations by citing paragraph 30 of Hillis and by interpreting the “weights” of Hillis as the claimed “trust score.” (See [0030].) The cited portions of Hillis, however, describe that ratings received from the evaluation systems can then be combined by and weighted averaging scheme, “in which the weights *reflect the relative degree to which the user values the opinion of the evaluation authority* that manages each evaluation system.” (See [0030].) The Hillis system is therefore averaging the ratings, and the average is the weight of the opinion of the evaluation authority, or the alleged “trust score” under the Examiner’s interpretation. Hillis, however, is completely silent on “determining an aggregate rating **for the document based on the rating information and the at least one trust score**,” as recited in amended claim 1 because the weights in Hillis, the alleged “trust score,” are never used in determining any “aggregate rating for the document” as recited in amended claim 1.

Clearly, then, Hillis, either alone or in combination with any of the art of record, does not disclose, teach, or even suggest all of the elements and limitations of the independent claims 1 and 29-32 of the instant case. Applicants, therefore, respectfully request the Examiner to withdraw the 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) rejection of independent claims 1, and 29-32 as well as all claims 10, 17-18, and 24-28, which are dependent therefrom.

## **II. Rejection of Claims 3, 5-6, 8-9, 11-16, and 19-23 under 35 U.S.C. §102(e)**

As discussed above, Hillis fails to teach or suggest the subject matter of independent claims 1 and 29-32. Claims 3, 5-6, 8-9, 11-16, and 19-23 depend from claim 1 and include all the recitations therein. The Examiner rejects claims 3-5, 9, 22-24 and 28 as being obvious over Hillis in view of Buck, Dahlstrom, Perkins, Mascarenhas, Kirshenbaum, Hosea, Ahlander, and Zigmond, but neither of these references cure the deficiencies of Hillis.

Buck, Dahlstrom, Perkins, Mascarenhas, Kirshenbaum, Hosea, Ahlander, and Zigmond fail to teach or suggest the claimed subject matter missing from Hillis, namely, “identifying at least one trust score, wherein the at least one trust score is associated with a specific one of a

plurality of evaluators; [and] determining an aggregate rating for the document based on the rating information and the at least one trust score,” as recited in claim 1. Nor does the Examiner assert that the references disclose such features.

Accordingly, Hillis and Buck, Dahlstrom, Perkins, Mascarenhas, Kirshenbaum, Hosea, Ahlander, and Zigmond, taken alone or in combination, do not teach or suggest each and every element of claim 1, and, therefore, cannot support a rejection of these claims or claims 3, 5-6, 8-9, 11-16, and 19-23, due to their dependence from claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

### **III. Information Disclosure statement**

Applicants again request the Examiner to consider the references on the Form SB/08A submitted on November 16, 2005 as well as again on March 2, 2007, and further request the examiner to initial in the left column of the Form SB/08A in accordance with MPEP 609.

### **IV. Conclusion**

In view of the foregoing amendments and remarks, Applicants submit that the claims are presently in condition for allowance, and request timely allowance of the pending claims. It is believed that all of the pending claims have been addressed. However, the absence of a reply to a specific rejection, issue, or comment does not signify agreement with or concession of that rejection, issue, or comment. In addition, because the arguments made above may not be exhaustive, there may be reasons for patentability of any or all pending claims (or other claims) that have not been expressed. Finally, nothing in this paper should be construed as an intent to concede any issue with regard to any claim, except as specifically stated in this paper, and the amendment of any claim does not necessarily signify concession of unpatentability of the claim prior to its amendment.


Applicant : Agarwal, et al.  
Serial No. : 10/812,417  
Filed : March 30, 2004  
Page : 12 of 12

Attorney's Docket No.: 16113-641001 / GP-254-00-US

Please apply any other charges or credits to deposit account 06-1050.

Respectfully submitted,

Date: 9/17/07

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Leila Abdi  
Reg. No. 52,399

Fish & Richardson P.C.  
1180 Peachtree Street, N.E.  
21st Floor  
Atlanta, GA 30309  
Telephone: (404) 892-5005  
Facsimile: (404) 892-5002

12034655.doc  
12034655.doc